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Abstract
Problems concerning discontinuation of overzealous therapy and so called ‘living wills” have been ignored 
in the Polish law through many years. Intensive transformations which have been made in the field of 
medical regulations since 1989 could not omit such a sensitive issue. Nowadays in Poland there have been 
an intensive debate regarding euthanasia, overzealous therapy and living will institutions. The purpose of 
this article is an analysis of current and suggested standard of law along with writing some remarks of 
comparative law nature. The issues raised in a public debate are similar to those once discussed in other 
European countries and the United States. 
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Crime of euthanasia versus 
discontinuation of overzealous therapy 
In the Polish juridical literature euthanasia is di-
vided into active and passive. The passive euthanasia 
(also called as negative) is sometimes recognized as: 
„discontinuation of medical treatment of curable 
disease in regard to a patient who is simultaneously 
subjected to incurable disease, doctor’s refusal of 
employment of extraordinary life saving means and 
employment of only ordinary means, discontinuation 
of patient’s treatment in accordance with his/her 
demands, or discontinuation of patient’s treatment 
without his/her consent when a doctor regards that 
further treatment only prolongs patient’s suffering, 
or unconditional refusal of any intervention at time 
of dying” [1]. The active euthanasia (called positive) 
is defined as an act of behavior which consists of 
action in order to cause or hasten someone’s death 
through, for example, delivery of lethal dose of drug 
or other deprivation of life [2].
In the international and comparative law there 
is almost universal prohibition of active euthanasia 
and doctor’s participation in the suicide act. Human 
life is protected by numbered of legal regulations. 
For example, article 6 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights anticipates that „Every hu-
man being has the inherent right to life. This right 
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life.” Similarly article 2 European 
Convention on Human Rights: „Every human being 
has the inherent right to life. This right shall be pro-
tected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his life.” This excludes possibility of performing 
euthanasiap understood as a deliberate doctor’s ac-
tion aiming at shortening of patient’s life. For ex-
ample, the European Court of Human Rights in 
case of Diane Pretty v. UK stated that prohibition in 
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delivery of assistance in suicide commitment may 
admittedly lead to interference into private life, 
but such interference is treated as reasonable in 
a democratic country [3]. 
Both euthanasia and medically assisted suicide 
are usually prohibited in accordance with penal 
law regulations. For example, in the United King-
dom, in case of R v Cox [4], the court found guilty 
of an attempt of murder a doctor who, according 
to patient’s wish, delivered her with lethal dose of 
chlorine potassium. [5] Similarly in Germany where 
paragraph 16 of the German Physicians Association 
guidance prohibits medical personnel to shorten 
human’s life actively and overrule his own or family 
interests on a basis of a good of patient. The French 
deontological code, in article 38, prohibits a doctor 
to bring deliberately death on a patient. A physician 
should accompany a patient at last moments of 
his life and pay to him as much attention as it is ne-
cessary to provide him with proper comfort and 
sense of dignity. [2] In Europe active euthanasia and 
medically assisted suicide are, under some terms, 
permitted in the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Belgium 
(euthanasia but not assisted suicide) [6-12], and 
medically supported suicide is permitted inter alia 
in Switzerland [3].
In accordance with an article 150 of the polish 
penal code each who kills human being on his de-
mand and under influence of compassion for him 
is subjected to imprisonment from 3 months through 
5 years [13]. This crime, according to the article 150, 
is of common character, even through a perpetrator 
of this crime will be a doctor or another member 
of medical personnel [14, 15]. In exceptional situa-
tions a court may apply extraordinary mitigation of 
punishment, or even may desist from its execution. 
A doctor is not permitted to provide any assistance 
to his/her patient in suicide act. The article 151 of 
the penal code constitutes: „Who, by persuasion 
or by assistance, leads human being to attempt on 
his life is subjected to punishment of imprisonment 
from 3 months through 5 years” [16–19].
In light of the Polish Penal Code regulations it 
appears to be problematic to distinguish between 
euthanasia and so called withdrawal of overzeal-
ous therapy. The opinions are divided. Some-
times both situations are interpreted entirely point-
ing that discontinuation of overzealous therapy 
is identical to passive euthanasia. It comes out from 
the fact that euthanasia homicide, as a rule, may be 
committed by action as well as by discontinuity of 
action to which, inter alia, is included resignation 
from support of patient’s life functions [14].
According to the Polish law overzealous therapy 
is most often defined as „an excessive, superfluous, 
artificial life support of patient with lethal disease 
or injury changes of basic organs with exercise of 
extraordinary means which only cause prolongation 
of suffers of the patient and in no case upgrade 
his/her quality of life” [2]. The Catholic Church ap-
proach in face of euthanasia and overzealous therapy 
was expressed in many documents. One of the first 
which mentioned the problem was the Saint Of-
ficium Decree dated on the 27th November 1940, in 
which the eugenic euthanasia of disabled human 
beings conducted in accordance with the Nazi pro-
gram T4 was to what negatively assessed [20–23]. In 
1957 physicians were addressed on subject of moral 
problems of anesthesia, in which the Pope stated that 
employment of pain appeasement means is allowed 
and recommended even when, as a consequence, 
the employed treatment causes risk to shorten pa-
tient’s life. Even though it was also underlined that 
any direct form to shorten patient’s life is forbidden 
because „it implicates direct governing over pa-
tient’s life” [24]. In the same year in an address on 
resuscitation problems the Pius XII made a division 
between ordinary and extraordinary means exercised 
in medicine. According to the Pius XII a physician 
is entitled to undertake specified methods, for ex-
ample artificial respiration, also is entitled to take 
decision of their discontinuation in case when the 
applied action is not effective [24].
In the Catholic Church Catechism it can be read 
that „euthanasia as action or discontinuation of 
action which itself or in anticipation causes death 
in order to liquidate pain constitutes homicide and 
is deeply against human being personal dignity”, 
and in the Encyclical Vita was added that assistance 
in suicide „was not to be justified even when it 
was committed on demand”. 
What are the differences between euthanasia 
(especially passive) and discontinuation of overzeal-
ous therapy? In the Polish juridical doctrine and 
the Church science usually division is introduced 
into proportional and disproportional means [2], 
“as usual (proportional — the author’s remark) are 
considered the means which employment gives ra-
tional hope for recovery and simultaneously does not 
cause unbearable suffer to a patient and a state of 
discomfort. In opposition to this as extraordinary 
means are recognized such forms of treatment 
which employment does not come with rational 
hope of recovery or pain appeasement, or which 
employment results in collateral effects in form of 
unbearable suffer or a state of discomfort [2]. Simi-
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lar divisions are sometimes applied in the American 
juridical system [3]. For example, in a sentence is-
sued in case of the In re Quackenbush it was stated 
that: public interest in area of human’s life protec-
tion is weakening and individual’s right for privacy 
is growing up along with scope of medical inter-
vention [25]. Deciding, whether important charg-
es connected with therapy should be undertaken it 
is necessary to take into account the period of time 
of which human’s life is able to be prolonged and 
conditions under which it will be conducted [26]. In 
case of Colyer [27] a court stated that public inter-
est in area of human’s life protection may require 
provision of life saving service against patient’s will. 
This interest weakens in such situation when treat-
ment only delays death of human being who is in in-
curable or lethal state. If required treatment is highly 
distressful and invasion the right of lethally diseased 
human must prevail [28].
In the doctrine of Polish juridical system the most 
important problem connected with qualification of 
employed to a patient means on proportional and 
disproportional is a proper qualification of artificial 
nutrition procedure (in dying patients). According to 
M. Safjan, former president of the Polish Constitu-
tional Tribunal, „there are moral and ethics reasons to 
state that human’s disconnection from artificial nu-
trition system in such situation is not euthanasia but 
only discontinuation of already initiated — though 
extended in time — dying process” [29].
In the Catholic Church science there is a domi-
nating approach in accordance with which artificial 
nutrition or hydration of a patient with employment 
of stomach probe is a proportional means. However, 
one needs to note that in the American juridical 
system such procedures are commonly recognized 
as health service [30]. A court in case of the In re 
Gardner [31], comparing discussed process with oth-
er life supported procedures, admitted that food and 
water deliveries to a patient possesses in itself some 
kind of symbolic derived from relations between 
a parent and a fed child. This symbolic disappears in 
case of artificial nutrition against will of the diseased. 
In case of the In re Estate of Longeway [32] a court, 
sentencing that there is a basic difference between 
traditional and artificial nutrition, stated that the sec-
ond mentioned procedure had a character of medical 
procedure and against which there was a possibility 
of refusal expressed by an entitled person. In the 
similar spirit statements were expressed by the High-
est Court of Ireland [33], Scotland [34], RSA [35], the 
British House of Lords [36] along with the German 
[37] and the Dutch courts [38–40].
Pointing at other differences which occur between 
euthanasia and overzealous therapy it is frequently 
underlined that the aim of euthanasia differs from 
the aim of discontinuation of overzealous therapy. 
According to M. Machinek „(…) the difference relies, 
from one hand, on the aim which stimulated acting 
(a patient or a doctor) and, from the other hand, 
on the selection of means. In case of euthanasia 
the direct aim of action (or discontinuation of ac-
tion) is causing patient’s death in accordance with 
his/her (sometimes only assumed) request. Selection 
of means also unambiguously leads at the same 
direction. In case of overzealous therapy its aim 
is neither shortening nor prolonging of patient’s life 
but is his/her protection against additional suf-
fers when in area of therapy nothing can be done 
for him/her. Resignation from extraordinary activi-
ties, disproportional and, in addition, usually costly 
and painful simply means not setting obstacles in 
regard to inevitable death” [41]. In a sentence issued 
in case of the Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical 
Hosp [42] a court admitted that in case regarding 
disconnecting of life support machinery the issue of 
suicide prevention is not applied in situation when 
permission admitted by a court is not applied to 
end of health life with assistance of artificial means, 
but only permits on further development of natural 
factors [43]. In the Matter of Conroy a court stated 
that expression of objection in face of life support 
intervention must not be properly recognized as an 
attempt of suicide commitment. (...) When death 
finally comes it will be a normal consequence of 
disease development, but not a consequence of 
autonomously hurt injuries [43].
Since 1991 Poland has been a member of the 
European Council, intergovernmental organization 
uniting almost all European countries, involved in, 
first of all, human rights protection, democracy and 
co-operation of all country members in area of cul-
ture. Debate on the subject of overzealous therapy 
must consist of approaches to numerous Resolu-
tions and Recommendations issued in a frame of 
the European Council.
In Recommendation 779 in case of rights of 
diseased and dying individuals from 1976 it is un-
derlined that development of modern diagnostic and 
treatment methods may lead to impersonal treat-
ment of patients for whom protection of attributed 
to them rights becomes more and more challenging. 
Creators of the Recommendation underline that pro-
longation of human’s life is as equally fundamental 
factor as minimizing of pain suffered by a dying 
person. A doctor undertaking all possible steps in 
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order to soften suffers is not allowed to deliberately 
hasten natural process of dying. 
In the Recommendation 1418 (1999) in case of 
human rights protection and protection of dignity of 
lethally diseased and dying individuals it was under-
lined that the right for dignified death is endangered 
by, inter alia:
 — unsatisfactory access to palliative care and to 
pain killing means;
 — artificial prolongation of dying process through 
employment of disproportional means or contin-
uation of further therapy without a patient’s ac-
ceptance;
 — lack of psychological support and limitations of 
science development of personnel conducting 
palliative care;
 — unsatisfactory assistance and support for family 
members and intimates of lethally diseased and 
dying individuals;
 — sensed by patients threat in face of loss of inde-
pendence and becoming burdensome for family 
and medical institutions;
 — deficit of funds and means dedicated for care of 
lethally diseased and dying individuals.
In an article 3 of the Venetian Declaration regard-
ing lethal diseases you can read, inter alia: „A doctor 
in any case should constrain from administering 
extraordinary means which will not be able to bring 
any advantage for dying”.
For the time being the problem of discontinu-
ation of overzealous therapy has not been directly 
regulated in the Polish juridical system. However, 
it does not mean that in this issue the legislator re-
mains totally in silence. In accordance with content 
of article 20 of act dated on 6 November 2009 on 
patient rights and patient rights ombudsman (Diary 
of Acts 2009, number 52, position 417) a patient 
has the right for dying in peace and dignity. In case 
of faulty offence of the law a court may adjudge 
appropriate amount of money on directed social 
object in accordance with an article 448 of the Civil 
Code. The legislator did not precise definition of dy-
ing „in peace and dignity”. Following guidelines of 
these definitions it is necessary to pay attention to 
regulations of the Doctors Code of Ethics which 
describe doctor’s responsibilities in terminal states. 
The mentioned act, voted by the Extraordinary Con-
vention of Physicians, only formally is deprived of 
juridical power. At that moment you can recollect 
entire scope of juridical regulations in accordance 
of which a doctor is obliged to follow statements of 
the mentioned code. For example, an article 4 of act 
dated on 5 December 1996 on professions of physi-
cians and dentists (uniformed text: Diary of Acts in 
2008, number 136, position 857) obliges doctors to 
fulfill their responsibilities in accordance with cur-
rent guidelines of medical science, according to 
rules of professional ethics and with duly careful-
ness. According to the statute dated on 2 December 
2009 on doctors chambers the Country Convention 
of Physicians is under obligation to pass resolution 
regarding ethics rules and professional deontology. 
Physicians are therefore obliged to follow eth-
ics rules and professional deontology along with 
other regulations regarding doctors professional 
responsibilities. What is more, they are subjected 
to professional responsibility in front of doctor 
courts for acting against ethics rules and profes-
sional deontology [3–46].
Creators of doctors code of ethics made differ-
ence among non-permissible euthanasia, assistance 
in suicide and overzealous therapy. In accordance 
with article 31 „Doctors are prohibited either from 
employment of euthanasia or delivery of assistance 
in suicide commitment by a patient”. However, in 
a terminal condition a doctor has no obligation 
to initiate and conduct resuscitation or overzeal-
ous therapy along with employment of extraordinary 
means (article 32). Obviously it does not discharge 
a doctor from responsibilities of duly carefulness to 
provide a patient with humanitarian terminal care 
and dignified conditions of dying. A doctor until end 
should allevate suffering of patients in a terminal 
condition and, as far as it is possible, support a qual-
ity of terminating life (article 30). 
In case of lack of legal regulations in regard 
to discontinuation of overzealous therapy a doc-
tor is obliged to abide by citied regulations of the 
Medical Code of Ethics. In opposite case a doc-
tor is exposed to civil responsibilities for offence 
of patient’s rights on dying in peace and dignity. 
Similar solutions are applied also in the Western 
countries [3], which exclude euthanasia and medi-
cally supported suicide and more often they allow to 
discontinue overzealous therapy in situation when 
human’s life inevitably comes to the end. For exam-
ple, British courts highlight that in such case a doctor 
is not further obliged to abide by duty to prolong 
patient’s life [47]. Also the American courts underline 
that dying patients more often need comfort and 
care instead of principal treatment [48]. In case of 
Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp. a court stated 
that discontinuation of treatment was ethically per-
mitted when it did not offer any further hope for 
attainment of therapeutic objective. Ethical rules, 
with some exceptions, do not require from a doctor 
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to carry all his/her duty aiming at prolongation hu-
man’s life at all costs [26].
Discontinuation of therapy as 
a consequence of objection expressed 
by a patient
From the crime of euthanasia and discontinuation 
of overzealous therapy there are other cases in which 
discontinuation of further treatment is a conse-
quence of objection expressed by a patient (distinctly 
articulated, submitted pro futuro or reconstructed 
with employment of accessible means of evidence).
As far in case of discontinuation of overzeal-
ous therapy making decision is related with a nega-
tive assessment of therapeutic chances, as far in 
case of objection the issue matters, first of all, to 
respect for autonomy and privacy exercised by each 
human being. 
It is suggested that a legislator should regulate 
both institutions apart from each other through 
introduction separated laws for discontinuation of 
overzealous therapy and patient’s objection. In the 
first case precise regulations are required, particularly 
in area of: definition of overzealous therapy, scope 
of doctor’s authorization and influence of third 
parties (for example patient’s family members and 
third parties). In case of creation an institution which 
would allow to take into account the patient’s objec-
tion it is necessary to define the way which would 
be employed in order to fix, without any doubts, 
patient’s will. This might be a tricky task as he or she 
might be no longer able to express his/her wishes. 
Norms protecting human rights grant each in-
dividual right to private life. The Polish courts in-
terpret this act widely as right to life in accordance 
with own choices and right to decide of own fate. 
Ignoring objection expressed by a patient and in 
consequence his/her enforcement to be subjected 
to medical intervention may lead to offence, inter 
alia, an article 8 of the European Convention for 
Human Rights. Also the European Convention of 
Bioethics in article 9 demands to take into account 
previously expressed wishes of interested individual 
in regard to medical intervention if at the moment of 
its conduct a patient is not in ability to express his/her 
will. This opinion is recognized in legislature of the 
European Court of Human Rights [49] and courts of 
other countries. For example, the Highest Court of 
the Federal Republic of Germany in a sentence dated 
on 13 September 1994 stated that right for au-
tonomy gives a patient possibility to express his/her 
objection in some terms as for medical intervention 
aimed at support his/her life [50]. The Highest Court 
of Ireland stated that part of right to privacy is the 
right to express consent or objection regarding medi-
cal service [28]. The right does not pass away only 
due to existing requirement to employ life supporting 
procedures or that a loss of consciousness occurred. 
The element of right to privacy is the right to dying 
in a natural way, with dignity, with a presence of 
the least pain.
As a matter of recognition of individual’s will 
as substantial factor patient is granted the right of 
consent or refusal on face of suggested medical in-
tervention. In accordance with an article 32 passage 1 
of act on physician and dentist profession a physician 
may conduct examination and deliver other medical 
services after expressing of consent by a patient. The 
act on patient rights grants a patient the right to 
express consent in regard to employment particular 
medical services or his/her refusal after being prop-
erly informed [51]. There is a righteous remark of 
M. Nesterowicz that „general, unlimited right for 
treatment against patient’s will and corresponding 
obligation to be subjected to treatment” is to be 
rejected [19]. The basis of any medical intervention 
may be patient’s consent or provision from extraor-
dinary act which permits employment of treatment 
against patient’s will [52–57].
Patient’s right to express consent or objection 
does not pass away in situation in which he/she con-
tracts serious, may be lethal disease. There is more 
to it, from rational legislator you should demand 
construction of such legal norms which in rational 
way allow an individual to employ autonomy and 
freedom, also in case of loss of awareness. A patient 
who remains in vegetative state should exercise the 
same scope of rights as diseased who did not lose 
conscious. This obligation comes out from entire 
range of international legal norms which, along with 
granting rights each human being, prohibit exercis-
ing any forms of discrimination. 
It is undoubtedly problematic to describe a will of 
unconscious person or who, under other conditions, 
is unable to make decision or express his/her will. The 
burden of making decisions requires to seek for such 
juridical instruments which, along with protection of 
autonomy, preclude eventual wrongdoing. Recogni-
tion of right to demand discontinuation overzeal-
ous therapy in regard to a patient who is unable to 
make conscious decision requires creation of proper 
procedures in the frame of which law would be 
executed [3]. In relation to patients who are unable 
to take decision in a conscious way it may consist of 
three components:
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 — firstly, it is necessary to establish whether a pa-
tient submitted an announcement pro futuro, 
expressing his will regarding exercising eventual 
life supporting procedures (inter alia, so called liv-
ing will, don’t resuscitate orders, durable power 
of attorney);
 — if a patient did not leave any document or evi-
dence which could be used to read his/her will 
it is necessary to ascertain, if it is possible, what 
decision he/she would make if he/she were con-
scious at that moment (so called substitutive 
judgment) — substitutive test;
 — if there are no evidences which could be em-
ployed for reconstruction of patient’s real will, 
the subject taking decision on behalf the patient 
should autonomously establish what is in the 
best interest of patient (so called best interest 
test) — impartial test [3].
Conclusions
The Polish law does not regulate precisely pa-
tient’s situation who remains in a vegetative state. 
In such a case general norms establishing rela-
tions patient — doctor should be maintained. In 
accordance with an act on patient rights a patient 
has the right of dying in peace and dignity. Guidance 
from this regulation should be made in accordance 
with the content of article 32 of the physician code of 
ethics which anticipates that in terminal states a phy-
sician is not obliged to initiate and conduct resuscita-
tion or overzealous therapy along with employment 
extraordinary means. This regulation should also be 
applied to cases of patients in a vegetative state in 
situation when recovery to conscious functioning 
is seemed to be impossible. 
A Polish physician who acts in accordance with 
content of article 32 of the physician code of eth-
ics restrains from employment of resuscitation, 
overzealous therapy or exercise of extraordinary 
means does not commit crime of passive euthanasia. 
Decision on discontinuation of overzealous therapy 
differentiates from euthanasia by goal to which 
a physician strives. As in the first case the matter 
is concerned on patient’s protection from additional 
suffers when in therapeutic scope nothing can be 
done for him as in case of euthanasia the principal 
aim is to shorten life of a human being [41].
From crime of euthanasia and discontinuation of 
overzealous therapy should be distinguished situa-
tions in which discontinuation of further treatment 
is a consequence of objection expressed by a pa-
tient (distinctly articulated, submitted pro futuro or 
reconstructed with accessible means of evidence), 
where a base of discontinuation of further treatment 
remains respect of patient’s autonomy in a vegeta-
tive state. 
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